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Europe’s Biotech Patent Landscape: Conditions and
Recent Developments
Tade Matthias Spranger*
INTRODUCTION**
1

After ten years of discussions and disputes, on July 30,
1998 the European Community’s (“EC”) “Directive 98/44/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on
2
the legal protection of biotechnological inventions” (“Directive”)
came into effect.
Until then, ethical considerations had
protracted the enactment of the Directive as a legal framework
for biotech patents.
Critics from among the European
Parliament (“EP”) referred to the “non-patentability of nature,”
especially with regard to patents on human DNA and gene
3
As a result, in 1995 the EP rejected the
sequences.
4
5
Commission’s first draft of the Directive from 1988. Fearing
* Assistant Professor, Institute for Public Law, University of Bonn. Dr.
Spranger also holds positions as Lecturer in German Administrative Law at
the Goethe-Institut and in Bundesvereinigung Öffentliches Recht e.v.,
Arbeitsgemeinschaft im Staats-, Verwaltungs- und Europarecht, at the centre
d´ étude de droit public, administratif et européen. He completed his First
Juridical State Exam, University of Bonn (Germany) in 1995 and Second
Juridical State Exam, State of Northrine-Westfalia in 1998. His publications
include over 130 articles on German Administrative and Constitutional Law,
Military Law, International Biotechnology Law, Intellectual Property Law,
and German and European Social Security Law, in over 70 publications.
** All translations by the author.
1. See N. R. Scott-Ram & A. G. Sheard, The Rise and Fall of the EU
Patent Directive, 13 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 734, 734 (1995).
2. 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 [hereinafter Directive]. The first portion of the
Directive contains a list of recitals. The recitals are not legally binding, but
clarify the intent of the drafters and provide guidance in interpreting the
provisions of the Directive itself.
3. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Proposal
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal protection of
biotechnological inventions,” 1996 O.J. (C 295) 11, 12.
4. The Commission of the EC is made of twenty “Commissioners.” The
Commission nearly always initiates the legislative process in the EC by
submitting a proposal. In addition, the Commission has executive powers in
various fields and has the power to initiate infringement suits against a
Member State that fails to meet its obligations under EC law.
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that the United States would consolidate its lead in the
biotechnological field, the Commission submitted a second draft
6
to the EP and the Council just a few months later. The second
draft then served as the basis for the Directive’s final wording.
The Directive is expected to guarantee legal uniformity and
certainty in providing patent protection for biotechnological
inventions.
According to Art. 15 paragraph 1 of the Directive, Member
States shall bring into force the laws, regulations, and
administrative provisions necessary to comply with the
7
Shortly after the
Directive no later than July 30, 2000.
Directive’s enactment, several Member States sought its
8
annulment. After the Advocate General gave his opinion in
9
favor of the Directive’s legal validity on June 14, 2001, the
Court of Justice of the European Communities declared the
10
Directive legal on October 9, 2001. However, many Member
States have still failed to discharge their obligations. Only
11
12
Ireland and Denmark have transformed the Directive into
national law, while other Member States are attempting to do
so.
In view of legal uncertainty in the field of patents on
biotechnological inventions, the rejection of the Dutch request
is an important step toward an adequate protection of
intellectual property in the EC.
However, the Advocate
5. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Proposal
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the legal protection of
biotechnological inventions,” 1996 O.J. (C 295) 11, 12.
6. The Council is the EC’s institution with the greatest legislative power.
It consists of representatives of the Member States drawn from the
governments of those states.
7. Directive, supra note 2 art. 5, ¶ 1, at 18.
8. See Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European
Parliament and Council of the European Union, Op. Advoc. Gen. ¶ 1 (2001),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/recent/
index_2001.html
[hereinafter Op. Advoc. Gen.].
9. See id.
10. See Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European
Parliament and Council of the European Union (2001), available at
http://www.curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgibin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&docre
quire=alldocs&numaff=C377%2F98&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=
&mots=&resmax=100.
11. See European Communities (Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions) Regulations, 2000 (Ir.).
12. Lov nr. 412 af 31 maj 2000 [Law No. 412 of 31 May 2000];
Bekendtgorelse om aendring af bekendtgorelse om patenter og supplerende
beskyttelsescertifikater. Ref: Bekendtgorelse nr. 1086 af 11/2000 (Den.).
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General’s final observations concerning the relationship
between ethical aspects and patent law are insufficient.
Regardless of the ratio of socio-economic aspects, vague ethical
considerations have deleterious effects on patent law’s
neutrality. In addition, the EC’s efforts to increase the role of
13
ethics in biotechnology law conflict with WTO law, which aims
to restrict the influence of socio-economic considerations in
trade-related decisions.
I.

THE APPEAL TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE

At the end of 1998, the Netherlands’ Lower House of
Parliament rejected a proposal to adopt the Directive into
Dutch law, arguing that the Directive’s content violates a
14
number of fundamental rights.
Eventually, the Dutch
government took its complaint to the European Court of Justice
15
seeking the Directive’s rescission. In particular, it brought an
action under Art. 173 of the EC Treaty (after amendment, Art.
16
230 EC) seeking annulment of the Directive.
Italy and
Norway, a non-Member State of the EC, supported the Dutch
17
action.
The Court of Justice dismissed the Dutch application for
18
interim measures on July 25, 2000.
In his subsequent
advisory opinion, Advocate General Jacobs also rejected the
13. See Tade Matthias Spranger, What is Wrong About Human
Reproductive Cloning? A Legal Perspective, 11 EUBIOS J. OF ASIAN AND INT’L
BIOETHICS, 101, 101-2 (2001); Tade Matthias Spranger, The Ethics and
Deliberate Release of GMOs, 11 EUBIOS J. OF ASIAN AND INT’L BIOETHICS, 144,
144-46 (2001).
14. See ALFRED MÜLLER, ET AL., ERNST & YOUNG’S EUROPEAN LIFE
SCIENCES 99, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, COMMUNICATING VALUE 65 (Mike Ward
ed. 1999); see also Geertrui van Overwalle, Octrooien vor planten onder de EGBiotechnologierichtlijn van 6 juli 1998 [Patents for Plants Under the EC
Biotechnology Directive of 6 July 1998], 7 AGRARISCH RECHT 111, 124 (1999).
15. See Op. Advoc. Gen., supra note 8, ¶ 15.
16. See id. ¶ 1.
17. See id. ¶ 13. France refused to implement the Directive on ethical
grounds as well. See Sabine Louët, French Refuse to Implement Biotech Patent
Directive, 18 NAT. BIOTECH. 820, 820 (2000). The United Kingdom is reported
to believe that no amendment to the UK Patents Act is needed. See Robin
Nott, Text of the EC Directive on Biotechnology, with introduction and
comment, 2 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 113, 119 (1998). The German government’s
draft of an Act on the implementation of the Directive is a word-for-word
transmission of the Directive’s provisions and, therefore, similarly fails to put
the framework of European Law into concrete terms.
18. See Op. Advoc. Gen., supra note 8, ¶ 15.
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19

material request on June 14, 2001. Although the Court is not
bound by the Advocate General’s opinion, it traditionally serves
as a guideline for the Court’s deliberations. Often, the Court
reaches the Advocate General’s conclusion for the same
20
If the Court does not follow the opinion of the
reasons.
Advocate General, it presents legal arguments supporting its
opposing position in much the same way as dissenting judges in
21
On October 9, 2001, the Court
other judicial systems.
followed the Advocate General’s lead and dismissed the
22
action, holding that the Directive complies with EC law. The
Advocate General’s opinion provides a well-balanced analysis of
23
the legal aspects of the case.
The Advocate General rejected the grounds for annulment
cited by the Dutch:
The grounds invoked for the annulment of the Directive were that
it (i) is incorrectly based on Art. 100a of the Treaty;
(ii) is contrary to the principle of susidiarity;
(iii) infringes the principle of legal certainty;
(iv) is incompatible with international obligations;
(v) breaches fundamental rights; and (vi) was not properly adopted
since the definitive version of the proposal submitted to the
Parliament and the Council was not decided on by the college of
24
Commissioners.

Although all the grounds advanced by the Dutch were
rejected, the action may not have been fruitless, as it may have
demonstrated that the concerns submitted by the Dutch
Government can and should be allayed. As the Advocate
General stressed in his opinion, within the Directive’s

19. See id.
20. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 72
(1993).
21. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES § 783 (5th ed. 1992).
22. See Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European
Parliament and Council of the European Union (2001), available at
http://www.curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgibin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&docre
quire=alldocs&numaff=C377%2F98&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=
&mots=&resmax=100.
See
generally
Tade
Matthias
Spranger,
Urteilsanmerkung [Case Note on Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands
v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Judgment of 9
October 2001], 50 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT
INTERNATIONALER TEIL 1047 (2001).
23. See Schermers & Waelbroeck, supra note 21, § 782.
24. Op. Advoc. Gen., supra note 8, ¶ 11.
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framework “there are adequate moral safeguards going, in
some respects, beyond mere application of the existing criteria
25
for patentability.” Furthermore, he stated that “the fact that
the ethical criteria for patentability is not exhaustively
defined . . . enhances it since future developments will continue
to be governed by those criteria even if not currently
26
foreseeable.”
II. THE DIRECTIVE’S MAIN OBJECTIVES
Following longstanding unemployment in Europe, the
European Community (“EC”) realized the importance of
protecting biotechnology intellectual property rights for its
economic development, due to biotechnology’s potential for
creating jobs. Understanding that national differences in the
legal protection of biotechnological inventions could “create
barriers to trade and hence impede the proper functioning of
27
the internal market,” the EC created a legal framework on its
own. Within this framework, the rules of national patent law
remain the essential basis for the legal protection of
biotechnological inventions. The EC’s legal standards are
limited to establishing certain principles for applying national
laws to the patentability of biological material as such.
A.

PATENTS ON HUMAN DNA AND GENE SEQUENCES

The most important part of the Directive ensures the
patentability of human DNA or gene sequences, which is also
guaranteed by World Trade Organization (“WTO”) law. For
example, Art. 27 paragraph 1 of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)
demands that “patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they meet the general requirements of novelty,
28
inventive step, and capability of industrial application.”
25. Id. ¶ 227.
26. Id.
27. Directive, supra note 2, recital 5, at 13.
28. Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 27, ¶ 1, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 319, 331 [hereinafter TRIPS]. See generally Hans-Jürgen
Schulze-Steinen, Patents, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 47, 48 (International Chamber of Commerce 1996).
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Before the Directive’s promulgation, the EC and some of its
Member States neglected their obligation to enforce this
29
standard.
The European Patent Convention of 1973, an
intergovernmental instrument that led to the establishment of
the European Patent Office (“EPO”), had been unable to fill this
gap, failing to provide clear standards for patents on
30
Now, the Directive explicitly
biotechnological inventions.
points out the need to assimilate the EC’s intellectual property
rights regarding biotechnological inventions to TRIPS’
31
requirements.
Article 3 paragraph 1 of the Directive states that
inventions “shall be patentable even if they concern a product
consisting of or containing biological material or a process by
means of which biological material is produced, processed or
32
used.” According to paragraph 2, “biological material, which
is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means
of a technical process, may be the subject of an invention even
33
The antagonists of
if it previously occurred in nature.”
biotechnology patents consider Art. 3 illegal, as it allows the
34
granting of “patents on life.” This assessment violates basic
principles of patent law.
First, patent law does not aim at the protection of living
organisms in situ, that is, as found in nature. Rather, “an
element isolated from a substance occurring in nature or
otherwise produced” is patentable since it is “the result of
technical processes used to identify, purify and classify it and

29. See generally S. J. R. BOSTYN, ENABLING BIOTECHNOLOGICAL
INVENTIONS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2001) (giving an overview of
European and U.S. patent law).
30. See H.-R. JAENICHEN, THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE’S CASE LAW ON
THE PATENTABILITY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY INVENTIONS vii (2nd ed. 1997). See
generally K. GOLDBACH ET AL., PROTECTION OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL MATTER
UNDER EUROPEAN AND GERMAN LAW (1997).
31. See Directive, supra note 2, recital 12, at 14, recital 36, at 16.
32. Id. art. 3, ¶ 1, at 18.
33. Id. art. 3, ¶ 2, at 18.
34. Den Leskien, Gentechnologie und Patentrecht [Genetic Engineering
and Patent Law], 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UMWELTRECHT 299, 301 (1996). See
generally Rainer Moufang, Problems Related to the Protection of New
Technologies: Biotechnological Inventions, in EUROPEAN RESEARCH
STRUCTURES – CHANGES AND CHALLENGES: THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 178 (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft ed., 1994);
Baljit Dhadda, Patenting Human Genetic Information. Is Nothing Sacred?, in
PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ETHICS 89 (Lionel Bently & Spyros Maniatis eds., 1998).
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reproduce it outside the human body, techniques which human
beings alone are capable of putting into practice and which
35
nature is incapable of accomplishing by itself.”
Second, the slogan “patents on life” creates the impression
that patents confer property rights. However, a patent for an
invention does not even authorize the holder to use the
invention; it merely entitles him to prohibit third parties from
36
In
exploring it for industrial and commercial purposes.
addition, even if the argument that genes should not be
“owned” because they exist in nature were well founded, it is
really a philosophical argument that cannot easily fit into the
37
grounds available for refusing a patent.
Third, “patents on life” have been granted for the last 160
38
years. In Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
v. Chakrabarty, the U.S Supreme Court upheld a patent
granted to Chakrabarty, a microbiologist for General Electric
39
Company, for oil-eating bacteria. Contrary to popular belief,
40
that was not the first patent to be granted for living matter.
Finland has been granting patent protection for living
41
organisms since July 24, 1843.
In addition, in 1873 Louis
Pasteur was granted U.S. Patent No. 141,072, containing a
claim to “yeast, free from organic germs of disease, as an article
42
of manufacture.” Therefore, Art. 3 of the Directive is far less
revolutionary than its opponents argue.
Regarding patents on parts of the human body, Art. 5 of
the Directive clarifies the general principles described in Art. 3.
Article 5 paragraphs 1 and 2 repeat the differentiation between
35. Directive, supra note 2, recital 21, at 15 (concerning patents on
substances deriving from the human body).
36. See id. recital 14.
37. See R. Stephen Crespi, Patents On Genes: Clarifying the Issues, 18
NAT. BIOTECH. 683, 683 (2000).
38. See Tade Matthias Spranger, Ethical Aspects of Patenting Human
Genotypes According to EC Biotechnology Directive, 31 INT’L REV. INDUS.
PROP. COPYRIGHT L. 373, 376 (2000).
39. See Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303 (1980); see also 1 IVER P. COOPER, 1
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW § 2.08 (2001 Revision); I. Jane Churchill,
Patenting Humanity: The Development of Property Rights in the Human Body
and the Subsequent Evolution of Patentability of Living Things, 8 INTELL.
PROP. J. 249, 270-72 (1994).
40. See PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 258 (3rd ed. 1999).
41. See Spranger, supra note 38, at 376.
42. COOPER, supra note 39, § 2.02.
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patentable inventions and non-patentable discoveries.
According to these provisions, neither the “human body, at the
various stages of its formation and development, [nor] the
simple discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence
or partial sequence of a gene, . . . constitute patentable
44
inventions.” On the other hand, “an element isolated from the
human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical
process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene,
may constitute a patentable invention, even if the structure of
45
that element is identical to that of a natural element.”
Article 5 of the Directive raises the question of the
patentability of ESTs, or Expressed Sequence Tags. ESTs
circumscribe partial sequences of a clone that is picked at
46
random from a cDNA library and used in the identification of
47
probably yet unknown genes found in a particular tissue.
According to some scholars’ assessments, ESTs do not
constitute a patentable invention, but rather a mere discovery,
48
However, the ESTs’
since their extraction is automated.
preparation is based on a technical procedure that does not
occur in nature and for that reason may constitute an
49
invention.
The crucial point is that Art. 5 paragraph 3 of the Directive
demands that the “industrial application of a sequence or a
partial sequence of a gene must be disclosed in the patent
50
application” as filed.
Hence, the required industrial

43. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶¶ 1-2, at 18.
44. Id. art. 5, ¶ 1, at 18.
45. Id. art. 5, ¶ 2, at 18.
46. cDNA stands for complementary DNA, which is synthesized from a
messenger RNA (mRNA) template by reverse transcription. The singlestranded form is often used as a probe in physical mapping.
47. See Martin Grund & Volker Vossius, Patentability of ESTs Under the
EPC, 2 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 106, 106 (1998).
48. See Andreas Oser, Patentierung von (Teil-) Gensequenzen unter
besonderer Berücksichtigung der EST-Problematik [Patents on Partial Gene
Sequences with Special Emphasis on ESTs], 47 GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL 648, 650 (1998);
see also Christian Gugerell, The European Experience, in LE GENIE GÉNÉTIQUE
[THE GENETIC GENIUS], BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PATENT LAW 87, 100-1
(Francois Dessemontet ed., 1996).
49. See Matthias Herdegen & Tade Matthias Spranger, ECLaw/Comment,
Directive
98/44/EC,
in
INTERNATIONALE PRAXIS
GENTECHNIKRECHT 1, 23 (Matthias Herdegen ed., 2001).
50. Directive, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 3, at 18.
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51

application must be concrete. For that reason, ESTs without
52
a specific function are not patentable under EC law.
In
addition, the concrete function requirement should also be the
guiding principle for patents on so-called SNPs, or Single
Nuclear Polymorphisms, which are single-base differences in a
53
DNA sequence among individuals.
The Directive’s Art. 6 establishes different criteria for the
patentability of inventions that refer to the human body.
Article 6 paragraph 1 refers to ordre public and morality as
54
internationally accepted limits to patentability. In addition,
paragraph 2 provides a list of inventions that are excluded from
patentability in order to provide national courts and patent
offices with a general guide for interpreting the reference to
55
According to this provision,
ordre public and morality.
56
“processes for cloning human beings,” “processes for modifying
57
the germ line genetic identity of human beings,” and “uses of
58
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes” shall
be considered unpatentable. It is important to stress that these
restrictions have no effect on the patentability of stem cell
procedures as stem cells can neither be considered clones nor
59
present embryos for the purposes of Art. 6 paragraph 2(c).

51. See Herdegen & Spranger, supra note 49, at 23; see also Matthias
Herdegen, Patenting Human Genes and Other Parts of the Human Body
Under EC Biotechnology Directive, 3 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 102, 104
(2000/2001).
52. See Herdegen & Spranger, supra note 49, at 23.
53. See id.
54. See Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, ¶ 1, at 18.
55. See id. art. 6, ¶ 2, at 18; see also Clair Baldock & Oliver Kingsbury,
Where Did It Come from and Where Is It Going? The Biotechnology Directive
and Its Relation to the EPC, 19 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 7, 14 (2000).
56. Directive, supra note 2, art. 6, ¶ 2(a), at 18. Note that the Directive’s
Art. 6 paragraph 2(a) discusses only the prohibition on techniques designed for
human reproductive cloning.
57. Id. art. 6, ¶ 2(b), at 18.
58. Id. art. 6, ¶ 2(c), at 18.
59. See Tade Matthias Spranger, Patentability of Human Stem Cell
Procedures in Accordance with EC Law, 11 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
(forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 8, on file with author). The scope of Art. 6
paragraph 2(c) is restricted to embryos which are capable of living in their
natural environment, i.e., in vivo. The Directive explicitly contemplates
“inventions for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the
human embryo and are useful to it.” Directive, supra note 2, recital 42, at 16.
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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Examining the ethical considerations of the granting of
patents is a very difficult task. Until now, international patent
law was free of ethical considerations. Although limitations for
patentability result from ordre public and morality, these terms
60
are used as strictly judicial conceptions. Both concepts have a
long and distinguished history as criteria for the lawfulness of
61
the grant or exercise of intellectual property rights.
For
62
example, both the TRIPS Agreement and the European
63
Patent Convention, neither of which are a part of EC law but
rather intergovernmental or international agreements, contain
a reserve with regard to a patent’s incompatibility with ordre
public or morality. Nevertheless, the Directive’s provisions
create a new level of interaction between ethics and the law.
First, the Directive’s Art. 7 states that “the Commission’s
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies
64
This group
evaluates all ethical aspects of biotechnology.”
may be consulted when biotechnology (including patents on
biotechnological inventions) are to be evaluated at the level of
65
Notably, German and French
basic ethical principles.
scholars are demanding a strengthening of patent law’s ethical
66
provisions.
This call for additional ethical consideration
seems to be superfluous as the Directive already contains a
clause applying standards of ethics. According to Recital 39,
“ordre public and morality correspond in particular to ethical or
67
moral principles recognised in a Member State.” Such ethical
or moral principles shall, regardless of the technical field of the
invention, supplement the standard legal examinations under

60. See Spranger, supra note 38, at 377-80.
61. See Op. Advoc. Gen., supra note 8, ¶ 38.
62. See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 27, at 331.
63. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent
Convention), Oct. 5, 1973, art. 53, § a.
64. Directive, supra note 2, art. 7, at 19.
65. See id. recital 44, at 16.
66. See Claus Luttermann, Patentschutz für Biotechnologie [Patent
Protection for Biotechnology], 44 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT
916, 920 (1998); see also Andreas Fuchs, Patentrecht und Humangenetik
[Patent Law and Human Genetics] 54 JURISTENZEITUNG 597, 598 (1999);
DICTIONNAIRE PERMANENT BIOÉTHIQUE ET BIOTECHNOLOGIES, BULLETIN 66
[PERMANENT DICTIONARY ON BIOETHICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, BULLETIN 66]
8381, 8383 (1998).
67. Directive, supra note 2, recital 39, at 16.
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68

patent law. This hidden rule leads to serious consequences,
which have gone almost unnoticed thus far: “ethical or moral
principles” are put in the same category as the legal terms
ordre public and morality. As a result, barriers between law
and ethics are abolished. Recital 39 is more than a mere
stylistic inaccuracy. Rather, the provision explicitly demands
an ethical supplement to the standard legal examinations
under patent law.
This regulation, notwithstanding the question of its
compatibility with WTO law, blurs the barriers between law
and ethics and is detrimental to patent law in that the
influence of ethics often results in decisions in which the ethical
perspective is not clearly distinguished from the legal
69
In contrast to ethics’ objective of philosophical
assessment.
reflection, the law’s intention is a practical one. The law does
not “proclaim values that it cannot, within reason, also put into
70
71
practice.” Even if the rule of law rests on moral principles,
law has to be readily ascertainable, distinct, and firm. Ethics,
in contrast, does not meet these requirements.
C.

FARMER’S PRIVILEGE

Another important question concerns the so-called farmer’s
72
privilege. Article 11 of the Directive states:
the sale or other form of commercialization of plant propagating
material to a farmer by the holder of the patent or with his consent
for agricultural use, implies authorization for the farmer to use the
product of his harvest for propagation or multiplication by him on
his own farm, the extent and conditions of this derogation
corresponding to those under Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No.
73
2100/94.

68. See id.
69. See Paolo Zatti, Towards a Law for Bioethics, in A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR BIOETHICS 53, 59 (Cosimo Marco Mazzoni ed., 1998).
70. Id. at 60.
71. See Zeynep Davran, The Ethical Foundations of the Rule of Law, in
ETHICS OF THE PROFESSIONS: MEDICINE, BUSINESS, MEDIA, LAW 117 (Ioanna
Kuçuradi ed., 1999).
72. See Herdegen & Spranger, supra note 49, at 32-33. See generally Tade
Matthias Spranger, Landwirteprivileg bei Patentierung biotechnologischer
Erfindungen nach der EG-Biotechnologierichtlinie [Farmers Privilege and
Patents on Biotechnological Inventions Under EC Biotechnology Directive] 29
AGRARRECHT 240 (1999).
73. Directive, supra note 2, art. 11, ¶ 1, at 19.
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Article 11 paragraph 2 extends the privilege to animal
reproductive material, stating:
the sale or any other form of commercialization of breeding stock or
other animal reproductive material to a farmer by the holder of the
patent or with his consent implies authorization for the farmer to
use the protected livestock for an agricultural purpose. This
includes making the animal or other animal reproductive material
available for the purposes of pursuing his agricultural activity but
not the sale within the framework or for the purpose of a
74
commercial reproduction activity.

Article 11 turns out to be problematic for two reasons.
First, paragraph 2 of Art. 11 corresponds with Art. 34 of
TRIPS, which states:
For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement
of the rights of the owner referred to in paragraph 1(b) of Article
28, if the subject matter of a patent is a process for obtaining a
product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order
the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical
product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members
shall provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that
any identical product when produced without the consent of the
patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:
(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product
was made by the process and the owner of the patent has been
unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process
75
actually used.

As a result, TRIPS Art. 34 imposes a reversal of the burden
of proof to the detriment of the farmer. The farmer has to
prove that he did not violate the rights of the holder of the
patent. Is this the correct approach? Taking into account the
possibility of self-sowing, the farmer’s difficulty in proving his
innocence is obvious. Although the Directive is indispensable
for the justified protection of entrepreneurial interests, the
reference to TRIPS Art. 34 turns out to be misguided.
The second problem refers to the extension of the farmer’s
privilege with regard to animals. Since the “sale within the
framework or for the purpose of a commercial reproduction

74. Id. art. 11, ¶ 2, at 19.
75. TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 34, at 334.
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activity” is excluded from the farmer’s privilege, it is difficult
to draw a bright line. What happens if the farmer has to sell a
part of his livestock due to financial problems? Is this a sale
within the framework or for the purpose of a commercial
reproduction activity? In this regard, the wording of the
Directive is absolutely insufficient.
D. COMPULSORY CROSS-LICENSING
In order to avoid a conflict between the holders of plant
variety rights and patents, the Directive provides for
77
compulsory cross-licensing of patent and plant variety rights.
Article 12 paragraph 1 states,
where a breeder cannot acquire or exploit a plant variety right
without infringing a prior patent, he may apply for a compulsory
licence for non-exclusive use of the invention protected by the
patent inasmuch as the licence is necessary for the exploitation of
the plant variety to be protected, subject to payment of an
78
appropriate royalty.

Where such a license is granted, “Member States shall provide
that . . . the holder of the patent will be entitled to a cross79
licence on reasonable terms to use the protected variety.”
Conversely, Art. 12 paragraph 2 ensures that the holder of a
patent may apply for a compulsory license for use of a protected
plant variety, and the holder of the variety right will be entitled
80
to a cross-license. By this, the Directive acknowledges the fact
that guaranteed access must be granted where the invention
represents significant technical progress of considerable
81
economic interest.
The conditions for cross-licenses mandated by Art. 12
paragraph 3 have been the object of much criticism. To comply
with this provision, applicants for cross-licenses must
demonstrate that “they have applied unsuccessfully to the
holder of the patent or of the plant variety right to obtain a
82
contractual licence” and that “the plant variety or the

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Directive, supra note 2, art. 11, ¶ 2, at 19.
See Baldock & Kingsbury, supra note 55, at 16.
Directive, supra note 2, art. 12, ¶ 1, at 19.
Id.
See id. art. 12, ¶ 2, at 19.
See id. recital 53, at 17.
Id. art. 12, ¶ 3(a), at 20.
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invention constitutes significant technical progress of
considerable economic interest compared with the invention
83
claimed in the patent or the protected plant variety.”
According to some scholars’ assessments, the absence of a
definition of what “unsuccessfully” means violates the general
84
principle of legal clarity: does unsuccessfully mean that the
applicant has been refused a license altogether or that the two
85
parties simply could not agree on the contractual terms?
Arguably, the meaning of “unsuccessfully” cannot be generally
defined, since its application is inevitably case specific.
However, the assertion that the meaning of “unsuccessfully” is
undetermined is not convincing, as TRIPS Art. 31(b) has
already established an applicable definition. TRIPS Art. 31(b)
concerns the use a patent without the authorization of the
86
patent holder. It states that
such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder
on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such
efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of
87
time.

Although TRIPS Art. 31(b) does not explicitly define
“unsuccessful,” it makes it clear that unsuccessful efforts are a
central tenant of international patent law.
Article 12 paragraph 3(b) is also unclear as to what
constitutes a significant technical progress of “considerable
economic interest.” Obviously, an individual’s interest cannot
constitute a considerable economic interest within the meaning
of Art. 12. Requiring such a determination would thwart the
purpose of patent law. Most scholars assume that it is the
public’s economic interest, rather than that of an individual
88
person or company, that would have to be evaluated.
However, the so-called “public’s economic interest” renders it
even more difficult to implement Art. 12 paragraph 3(b): public
interests are too varied and divergent to provide a legal
83. Id. art. 12, ¶ 3(b), at 20.
84. See generally Matthias Herdegen, The Origins and Development of the
General Principles of Community Law, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 1 (U. Bernitz & J. Nergelius eds., 2000).
85. See J. Ardley, Compulsory Cross-Licensing: An Examination of Article
12 of the Biotechnology Directive, 2 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 135, 36 (1998/1999);
see also Baldock & Kingsbury, supra note 55, at 16.
86. See TRIPS, supra note 28, art. 31(b), at 333.
87. Id.
88. See Ardley, supra note 85, at 136.
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standard in any particular case. Instead, the “considerable
economic interest” for the purposes of Art. 12 paragraph 3(b)
should be assumed if the compulsory license would have a
89
stimulating effect on a specific branch of industry.
CONCLUSION
The legal framework of the “Directive 98/44/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the
legal protection of biotechnological inventions” seems to be
defective and full of loopholes. In particular, it fails to expel
ethical considerations from patent law. Nevertheless, it
presents an important step toward the improvement of the
patentability of biotechnological inventions in Europe, as it
recognizes the need for an adequate protection of intellectual
property. In view of the Directive’s implementation, the
Member States should take the opportunity to redress the
remaining incongruities.

89. See RICHARD FLAMMER, BIOTECHNOLOGISCHE ERFINDUNGEN IM
PATENTRECHT [BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS IN THE FIELD OF PATENT
LAW] 173 (1999).

